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Strengthening of the United Nations system

United Nations reform: measures and proposals

Restructuring of the United Nations peace and security pillar

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The reform of the peace and security pillar of the United Nations Secretariat is a vital and timely step that I am initiating as part of the wider effort to reform the Organization. Today's peace and security challenges and the shortcomings of the Organization that have been identified in a number of reviews and studies call for adjustments to the architecture and working methods of the peace and security pillar of the Secretariat, with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the pillar by reducing the fragmentation of efforts and ensuring a more joined up, whole-of-pillar approach to the delivery of mandates and stronger cross-pillar cooperation. The present report contains my proposal, for the consideration of the General Assembly, for restructuring the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Peacebuilding Support Office, as well as related changes in the Organization's working culture. It describes the basic concept, underlying principles and goals of the reform. Should the Assembly support the concept and the outlines of the reform, another report providing further details on the proposal, including its full financial implications, will be submitted.

The overarching goals of the reform and restructuring of the peace and security pillar are to prioritize prevention and sustaining peace; enhance the effectiveness and coherence of peacekeeping operations and special political missions; make the peace and security pillar more coherent, nimble and effective through a "whole-of-pillar" approach; and align the peace and security pillar more closely with the development *and human rights pillars*.

The proposal has five main elements. First, the creation of a Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and a Department of Peace Operations. Second, the creation of a single political-operational structure under Assistant Secretaries-General with regional responsibilities, reporting to the Under-Secretaries-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and for Peace Operations. Third, the establishment

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of a Standing Principals' Group of the Under-Secretaries-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and for Peace Operations, under my chairmanship. Fourth, the enhancement of certain priority areas to ensure coherence and coordination across the peace and security pillar. And fifth, the introduction of several non-structural changes in the way the peace and security pillar works on a daily basis.

I. Introduction

1. The prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes is the raison d'être of the United Nations. While the Organization today is called upon to perform a wide range of critical roles, from development work to humanitarian assistance, to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, there is no question that it arose from the ashes of war in order to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". More than seven decades later, that goal remains as relevant and as urgent as ever. Despite its continued and relentless efforts, the multiplicity and growing complexity of today's peace and security challenges and threats often surpass its ability to respond. Today's global landscape demands a United Nations that is not only more effective and coherent, but one that places conflict prevention and sustaining peace at the core of its efforts.

2. While the causes of international failure to prevent some of the deadliest conflicts are diverse and complex, I have long been convinced that the fragmentation of efforts across the United Nations system contributes to undermining the Organization's ability to respond to crises and conflicts early and effectively. The Secretariat, in particular the peace and security pillar, needs to be more nimble, pragmatic, coherent and flexible, with the ability to develop and more effectively support a diverse range of engagements, including operations, across a conflict cycle and with a range of actors within the United Nations system and beyond. The heads of the peace and security entities and their staff deserve credit for their commendable efforts to overcome those challenges through close coordination and collaborative working relations. It is now necessary to address challenges through the institutional reform of the peace and security pillar.

3. Upon taking office, I announced steps to address structural and non-structural disincentives and barriers to a more effective discharge of the Secretariat's core peace and security responsibilities. I established an internal review team to study existing proposals for change in the Secretariat's peace and security architecture, including the 2015 reports of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (see A/70/95-S/2015/446) and the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (see A/69/968-S/2015/490) and the 2015 global study on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), and to develop and present options for further improvements to its structures and working methods.

4. In those reviews, the following key parameters were highlighted: (a) the growing scale and complexity of modern conflict; (b) the primacy of political solutions and the need for greater attention to addressing the root causes of conflict and prioritizing the prevention of conflict and sustaining peace; and (c) the importance of nationally owned, people-centred and inclusive political solutions to conflicts and crises. The fragmentation of the United Nations system was seen as a critical limiting factor in the Organization's ability to engage early, flexibly and effectively across the spectrum of conflict, drawing on the full set of available tools. It was indicated in the reviews that separate financing arrangements for the United Nations engagement in peace and security issues, an overly bureaucratic and non-responsive administrative framework, and institutional competition were further impediments to strategic and operational coherence. The need for stronger global and regional partnerships with non-United Nations entities to collectively address contemporary multidimensional peace and security challenges was also identified. The need for smoother and more effective transitions between different types of United Nations engagement and presences at the field level was highlighted.

5. Member States have asked me to deliver on key issues in prevention, sustaining peace and peacekeeping. My predecessor's report on the implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations

(A/70/357-S/2015/682) contained some of the measures he had taken in his remaining tenure to address those priorities. I was encouraged to undertake a more comprehensive consideration of the Panel's recommendation to restructure the Secretariat's peace and security architecture. Strong appeals for reform were also contained in the concurrent Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture ("sustaining peace") of April 2016 (Assembly resolution 70/262 and Council resolution 2282 (2016)). The Assembly and the Council called for progress across a number of core areas of direct relevance to the restructuring of the peace and security pillar, including the need to enhance policy and operational coherence within and across the United Nations system; improve internal leadership, accountability and capacities; and strengthen partnerships among the United Nations and key stakeholders. They also called for the revitalization of the Peacebuilding Support Office, on which I will report in full as requested during the seventy-second session of the Assembly. As outlined in the document shared with Member States on 3 May 2017, prioritizing prevention and sustaining peace encompasses both a surge in preventive diplomacy and effectively addressing underlying challenges through a concerted focus on implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In its resolution 2378 (2017), the Council reaffirmed its resolve to strengthen the central role of the United Nations in peacekeeping and welcomed my intention to introduce peacekeeping reform within the Secretariat as well as on the ground.

6. Against the background of the evolving nature of today's peace and security challenges and after careful consideration of the findings and recommendations of the internal review team and the priorities and needs of Member States, the reorganization of the peace and security pillar of the Secretariat, as well as an improvement of its working methods, is proposed. The proposal does not seek to change the established mandates, functions or funding sources of the Secretariat or the component parts of the peace and security pillar. On 12 September 2017, I shared an informal note with Member States summarizing this proposal. I am grateful for the positive feedback I have received from Member States so far and for their encouragement to undertake bold and meaningful reforms of the peace and security pillar in consultation with Member States. I will continue to take into account observations and inputs I receive from Member States.

7. My proposals are part of a larger agenda of reform of the Organization to make it fit for delivering on the promise of the Charter of the United Nations to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". I submitted my proposed improvements to United Nations management to the General Assembly, and have outlined the repositioning of the United Nations development system to deliver on the 2030 Agenda to the Economic and Social Council. I have presented my strategy to achieve gender parity, as well as a number of other internal steps within my authority to improve coherence and coordination. Member States have already acted on my proposal to establish the Office of Counter-Terrorism. I will seek to ensure that all reform efforts under my leadership are mutually reinforcing and aim to foster a whole-of-system approach.

8. My proposal for the reform of the peace and security pillar has two dimensions. First, the restructuring of the key substantive entities, namely, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Peacebuilding Support Office, as well as related changes in the working culture, will ensure more joined-up, whole-of-pillar and cross-pillar engagement for prevention, crisis response and sustaining peace.

9. The second dimension comprises a series of measures that I have shared with Member States in my report on shifting the management paradigm in the United Nations (A/72/492 and A/72/492/Add.1). They are aimed at bringing decision-making

closer to the point of delivery; trusting and empowering managers; ensuring greater accountability and transparency; reducing duplicative structures and overlapping mandates; increasing support for the field; and reforming the planning and budgetary processes. If approved, my management reforms will strengthen the Organization's ability to deliver nimble, effective, accountable, efficient and decentralized operational support to the peace and security pillar, including peace operations.

10. The present report represents the formal presentation of the substantive aspects of my proposal for the reform of the peace and security pillar for the consideration of the General Assembly. It describes the basic concept, underlying principles and goals of the reform, and elaborates on my note of 12 September 2017 on the restructuring of the peace and security pillar, taking into account the feedback provided thus far by Member States.

11. I believe that this proposal is sufficiently far-reaching and innovative enough to improve the way the peace and security pillar functions. At the same time, it is realistic, manageable and — most importantly — achievable. It seeks to enable the more effective delivery of existing mandates and functions and to build a stronger approach to addressing peace and security challenges, underpinned by strengthened partnerships inside and outside the Organization, while also reaffirming the principle of national ownership. My aim is to strengthen and improve the Organization's engagement on peace and security matters through the reorganization of relevant departments and offices and the development of working methods and an organizational culture that supports a "whole-of-pillar" approach.

12. My proposal is intended to be cost-neutral. It does not seek any reallocation of resources from development or other areas to peace and security, or vice versa. I am hopeful that the General Assembly will approve the concept and basic elements of the proposal.

II. Goals of the proposal for reform

13. Since taking office, I have tried to articulate a forward-looking vision for the United Nations and prioritized the prevention of crises and conflicts that take a high toll on humanity and undermine institutions and capacities to achieve peace and development and protect human rights. I identified preventing violent conflict and sustaining peace as the priority. I am convinced that by prioritizing prevention, we can also enhance the coherence and coordination of efforts across the pillars at all stages of a conflict.

14. The goals of my proposal are to: (a) prioritize prevention and sustaining peace; (b) enhance the effectiveness and coherence of peacekeeping operations and special political missions, ensuring the primacy of politics and flexibility of approach; (c) make the peace and security pillar more coherent, nimble and effective through a "whole-of-pillar" approach to address fragmentation; and (d) align the peace and security pillar more closely with the development and human rights pillars.

15. First, the peace and security pillar as a whole must increase its capacity to help prevent conflict and its ability to more rapidly and effectively respond to the warning signs of crises and the outbreak or escalation of conflicts. The Organization must identify at an early stage emerging threats to peace and engage through rapid and effective good offices and mediation to prevent the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict. Efforts to prevent conflicts and major crises from breaking out in the first place, with the support of the Security Council and working with concerned stakeholders and partners, must receive the highest priority. The Organization must significantly reduce the need to intervene through large-scale

peace operations and large-scale humanitarian responses. I have stressed the need for a "surge in diplomacy for peace" through the strategic use of my good offices, bolstered by capable envoys with different backgrounds and skills, including increased numbers of mediators, both men and women, with different geographical backgrounds and expertise. This surge should build on an enhanced United Nations prevention and mediation posture, including through regional offices as forward platforms for preventive diplomacy; strengthened support for building national and regional capacities for prevention and mediation; deeper partnerships with national and regional stakeholders and other mediation actors; more effective engagement by peace operations; and more robust and predictable funding for preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, peacebuilding and mediation. As part of this effort, I have established the High-level Advisory Board on Mediation, comprising 18 internationally recognized personalities who will provide me with advice and support on specific mediation efforts. Adherence to the vision of sustaining peace throughout prevention, conflict resolution, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding engagements, in the field and at Headquarters, and through partnerships with national, regional and other stakeholders at all stages of the conflict cycle will help to ensure that greater attention is paid to analysing and addressing the root causes of conflict in any given context.

16. Second, even with the best of efforts to prevent conflict, armed conflicts and other forms of violence will continue to threaten national, regional and international peace and security. The deployment of peace operations will therefore remain an essential and highly visible element of the peace and security repertoire of the United Nations. My intention through these proposals is that peace operations place political solutions at the centre of their efforts, and are more fit for purpose in today's complex world, on the basis of more tailored, sequenced and flexible mandates and variable mission designs. They need to address the complexity of current conflicts, which require a context-driven approach, by working closely with national stakeholders and United Nations country teams. Peace operations must be a key ingredient in a well-coordinated institutional structure for prevention and sustaining peace, political strategies, conflict resolution and crisis management. The United Nations must also be prepared to address new and growing political and security challenges, and my proposal will help to ensure that peace operations effectively adapt to those challenges, which would require better-tailored and sequenced mandates.

17. Third, the peace and security pillar must become more nimble, coherent and effective and embody a "whole-of-pillar" approach that prioritizes prevention and sustaining peace while addressing key strategic, political and operational priorities. As outlined in the present report, both structural and non-structural elements must contribute to creating a more effective, coherent and joined-up pillar, enabling the United Nations to contribute earlier, better and more comprehensively to efforts to sustain peace, prevent conflict and respond to the escalation of a crisis or the outbreak of conflict. My proposal seeks to overcome fragmentation and facilitate the effective use of capacities across the peace and security pillar, with a strengthened focus on supporting and enabling the field and working with multidisciplinary teams drawn from across the United Nations system. In this respect, I emphasize that while my proposal, as set out below, envisages the existence of two separate departments, they would function as joined-up entities responsible for the entire range of peace and security engagements and operations.

18. Fourth, the peace and security pillar must be organized and positioned to work more effectively with the rest of the United Nations system. The pillar should ensure alignment with the human rights pillar and integrate human rights in its work. The pillar must also work closely with the development system, as well as the humanitarian arm of the United Nations. The role of Resident Coordinators and

United Nations country teams is crucial in this regard. To this end, the functions of the Peacebuilding Support Office, under the overall leadership of the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, will be bolstered and assume a stronger cross-pillar bridging role in the future. Critical to this will be to ensure proper support for the Peacebuilding Commission and its strengthened advisory, convening and bridging role among the principal organs and relevant entities of the United Nations, and the management of a strengthened Peacebuilding Fund, providing catalytic, rapid-response and flexible support as a facilitator to sustain peace, on my behalf. The components of the current Peacebuilding Support Office will be empowered to connect the pillar with system-wide efforts and tools across the conflict spectrum and strengthen partnerships with United Nations and non-United Nations entities, in line with the vision of the resolutions on the review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture.

19. There are strong linkages between the reform of the peace and security pillar and the focus on the repositioning of the United Nations development system, on which I reported earlier in 2017 (see A/72/124-E/2018/3) and will again report on in December. Building effective and resilient institutions and national capacities that can withstand shocks and stresses that lead to conflict is key to my prevention agenda. By making United Nations country teams better equipped with relevant capacity and expertise for building national capacities, I am convinced that the United Nations will be more effective in helping Member States to achieve their goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

III. Proposed reorganization of the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Peacebuilding Support Office

20. My proposal seeks to organize and integrate existing substantive capacities and resources more rationally in order to channel them more effectively towards achieving the goals outlined above. It also envisages important non-structural changes. It calls for the creation of:

(a) A Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, which would combine the strategic, political and operational responsibilities of the Department of Political Affairs and the peacebuilding responsibilities of the Peacebuilding Support Office. The Department would prioritize and direct capacities and resources to the prevention of conflict, mediation, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, as well as to enhanced cross-pillar cooperation and a variety of specialized capacities. It would provide direction, management and support for regional offices, my special and personal envoys and advisers and offices in support of political processes;

(b) A Department of Peace Operations, which would combine the strategic, political and operational responsibilities of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs to provide direction, management and support for peacekeeping and field-based special political missions outside the purview of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, as well as a variety of specialized capacities;

(c) A single political-operational structure under Assistant Secretaries-General with regional responsibilities, with dual reporting lines to the Under-Secretaries-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and for Peace Operations, which would belong to and link the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations and would be responsible for the day-to-day management of all political and operational peace and security activities. This

regional approach would enhance understanding of specific contexts and facilitate engagement and cooperation with regional and other partners;

(d) A Standing Principals' Group of the Under-Secretaries-General of the two proposed departments, under my chairmanship, which would provide unified leadership for strategic, political and operational responsibilities to ensure a coherent "whole-of-pillar" approach at Headquarters and in the field.

Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

21. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs would manage a spectrum of engagements in the area of peace and security to ensure a more holistic approach to sustaining peace. These would include early upstream monitoring, early warning and response, envoys, regional political offices, offices in support of political processes, mediation and electoral assistance support and other preventive, conflict resolution, mediation and peacebuilding activities, including through enhanced cross-pillar cooperation and strategic and policy partnerships. The Department would also oversee and manage my good offices and diplomatic efforts, including political aspects of relations with Member States and other intergovernmental organizations, in its areas of responsibility.

22. The Department would dedicate institutional capacity and space to conflict prevention and sustaining peace. It would identify and analyse threats to peace and security in coordination with the Department of Peace Operations and other Secretariat and United Nations system partners, notably the human rights and development pillars. It would develop and employ relevant tools, capacities and expertise for prevention and mediation. To that end, it would rely on regional offices as forward platforms for preventive diplomacy; build partnerships with regional and other actors; and provide dedicated mediation support and electoral assistance to Member States. The Department would provide analytical and support capacities to Resident Coordinators and United Nations country teams to help to develop national capacities to address the drivers and root causes of conflict. It would also engage with and through the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund.

23. The Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs would assume the responsibilities currently carried out by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs as the system-wide focal point for United Nations electoral assistance, mandated by the General Assembly in its resolution 46/137 and reaffirmed every two years.

24. The components of the current Peacebuilding Support Office (policy, intergovernmental and financing) would remain integrated under the leadership of an Assistant Secretary-General, and would be strengthened to serve as a bridge for cross-pillar cooperation, managing the Peacebuilding Fund and supporting the Peacebuilding Commission. The Commission has an important role to play as a dedicated intergovernmental advisory body to bring coherence to international peacebuilding efforts, bridging the pillars of the United Nations system and serving as a platform to convene a diverse and broad-ranging set of actors. Support for the Commission would be bolstered by a strong functional linkage between the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations, including the single regional political-operational structure, to ensure the Commission's connection to shared regional analysis, strategies and field presences. The terms of reference of the Peacebuilding Fund would remain unchanged, and a functional linkage would be maintained with the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, providing a catalytic, timely and flexible pre-positioned pooled fund as a facilitator for sustaining peace across the United Nations system. The Peacebuilding

Fund would also assume a strategic resource mobilization role for predictable and sustained financing for peacebuilding.

25. The peacebuilding components of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs would thus act as a "hinge" between the peace and security pillar and the United Nations development system and humanitarian actors. This arrangement would include the participation of the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support in the coordination mechanisms of the United Nations Development Group, the proposed joint steering committee for development and humanitarian coordination and the Executive Committee. With an emphasis on prevention and sustaining peace, the arrangement would contribute to the revitalization of the Peacebuilding Support Office, as mandated in the resolutions on the review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture. I will provide further detail on this revitalization in my next report.

26. As mandated in the resolutions on the review of the peacebuilding architecture, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs would draw together the expertise of the United Nations system to facilitate coherent system-wide action and support partnerships for conflict prevention and sustaining peace. This would include intensified collaboration with international financial institutions, in particular the World Bank, as well as civil society, women's organizations and the private sector. The Department's work on partnerships would also include support and capacity-building for regional and subregional organizations and entities, as well as the development of regional initiatives and strategies, together with the Department of Peace Operations and other United Nations partners.

27. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs would provide substantive and secretariat support to the Security Council, and some subsidiary organs of the General Assembly and the Security Council, such as the Peacebuilding Commission, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It would provide administrative and substantive support to sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, and other mechanisms. Electoral assistance and mediation support would be located in the Department. The Department would provide support to non-United Nations entities on peace and security issues, as mandated.

Department of Peace Operations

28. The Department of Peace Operations would provide integrated strategic, political, operational and management advice, direction and support to peacekeeping operations, as well as to field-based special political missions outside the purview of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. This would ensure greater nimbleness, coherence and consistency and encourage the creation of an integrated "centre of excellence" for United Nations peace operations. I wish to emphasize, however, that this proposal fully recognizes the distinct nature of peacekeeping operations and special political missions, as well as their different financing mechanisms.

29. The Department of Peace Operations would be responsible for preventing, responding to and managing conflict and sustaining peace in countries and areas in which peacekeeping missions and field-based special political missions outside the purview of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs are deployed. Its responsibilities would include facilitating and implementing political agreements, providing advice and support through thematic experts in a range of areas and leading integrated analysis of and planning for peace operations and the countries and areas

in which peace operations are deployed, in coordination with the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and other Secretariat and United Nations system partners. They would also encompass the development of relevant programming at the country level to address drivers and root causes of violent conflict. The Department would also continue to enhance effective partnerships and coordination in support of the mandates and strategies of United Nations missions under its purview.

30. The Department would support diplomatic efforts by peace operations under its responsibility, including relations with Member States, intergovernmental bodies, regional and other organizations and other stakeholders, as relevant and in coordination with the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and other partners. To this end, the Department would ensure that it uses the full range of relevant tools, capacities and expertise to enhance its support for peace operations and the countries and areas in which they are deployed, in cooperation with all relevant stakeholders. Where mandated, the Department would also provide support to non-United Nations entities and missions on peace and security issues.

31. The Office of Military Affairs, led by an Assistant Secretary-General, will be located in the Department of Peace Operations. It will carry out its core mandated tasks, including capability definition and force generation, deployment and oversight of military components of missions. The single regional political-operational structure will facilitate and increase the effectiveness of many activities of the Office, such as the provision of technical military advice and support to political and peace processes, including those in which no United Nations operational deployment is contemplated, and the provision of military planning and deployment advice to partners.

32. The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, led by an Assistant Secretary-General, will provide operational and advisory support to rule of law and security sector institutions, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and mine action. It will ensure systematic collaboration with all relevant United Nations and non-United Nations actors, as is currently done through the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict and Other Crisis Situations and inter-agency working groups on security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The Police Division and other components of the Office would work with the single political-operational structure to support stabilization and help to carry out protection-related tasks in field missions, as well as capacity-building and advisory functions. The location of the police and military components in one department would help to maintain the necessary links between police and military elements in planning, force generation, deployment and protection-related activities.

IV. "Whole-of-pillar" approach

Single regional political-operational structure

33. Central to my proposal would be to combine the current regional divisions of the Department of Political Affairs and the Office of Operations of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations into a single political-operational structure to be shared by the two new departments. The structure would be headed by Assistant Secretaries-General with defined regional responsibilities. The shared capacity would be responsible for the entire range of political and operational engagements on peace and security issues, including the provision of strategic, political and operational guidance, analysis and direction and integrated operational support for prevention and sustaining peace, as well as crisis monitoring and response. The Assistant Secretaries-

General would develop integrated strategies and approaches for prevention, crisis response and sustaining peace in their respective regions.

34. The establishment of a single political-operational structure would ensure that field presences have one point of entry for political and operational requirements from Headquarters. It would also facilitate smoother, more coherent and effective transitions between different types of United Nations engagement. The use of the support account for peacekeeping operations and the regular budget will remain unchanged.

35. The single political-operational structure would also enable improved regional analysis, strategies and responses with combined regional expertise under a single regional leadership; strengthen the coherence and integration of political and operational mandates and engagements; facilitate early warning and the activation of preventive measures, and crisis response; provide substantive guidance and support to field presences; enhance cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, among other partners; and ensure continuity in transitions between mission and non-mission contexts, as well as between special political missions and peacekeeping operations. All peace and security presences would benefit from strengthened and coordinated political and operational guidance as a result of combining all regional teams and capacities in one structure. Member States and other partners would find it easier to engage the relevant interlocutor on a wide range of issues applicable to a particular country or region.

36. The Assistant Secretaries-General would report to the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on issues relating to non-mission settings, regional offices, offices in support of political processes and offices of my special envoys and advisers, and to the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations on issues relating to peacekeeping missions and field-based special political missions outside the purview of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the countries and areas in which they are deployed, while keeping the other Under-Secretary-General informed. The dual reporting arrangement represents a new and innovative way of working that enhances coherence between the related responsibilities of the two departments. It will require significant leadership and management investment and highly collaborative working relationships, embodied in a new, more synergetic working culture. The respective regional areas would be organized by regional divisions and further organized into teams tailored to the specific context and needs, with the aim of enhancing intra-pillar and cross-pillar coherence. Reporting lines to both the Department of Peace Operations and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs would ensure access to relevant specialized capacities, as well as the flow of information to and from and coordination with the other Assistant Secretaries-General in the two departments.

37. I am committed to providing effective Headquarters support to peacekeeping and special political missions. Mechanisms for ensuring integration and coherence with regard to political engagements and operations will be reviewed and enhanced.

38. Structures and internal measures would be designed to allow the Assistant Secretaries-General to ensure that crisis management and operational exigencies in the backstopping of peace operations do not draw capacities away from the work on conflict prevention A clear division of labour would be fostered and maintained to allow staff both to dedicate more time to political analysis, devising strategies and process design, as core functions of prevention, and to fulfil the political and operational requirements for backstopping peace operations. As such, these proposals will seek to foster sufficient space, capacities and resources for preventive diplomacy and other prevention activities. The Assistant Secretaries-General would also ensure that regional dimensions of conflict inform mission-specific strategies and are

addressed systematically through the development and implementation of regional strategies, in coordination with relevant partners and United Nations field presences.

39. The success of the single political-operational structure will depend on strong partnerships and coordination mechanisms that unite all peace and security pillar stakeholders. It would benefit from collaborative approaches and resources for deeper cross-pillar cooperation, including through institutionalized cooperation models, such as the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict and Other Crisis Situations, the Joint Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention of the United Nations Development Programme and the Department of Political Affairs, existing capacities relating to electoral assistance and mediation support, and the role of the peacebuilding components of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs in fostering system-wide coherence.

40. Relevant coordination mechanisms will continue to bring together political, security, development, human rights, humanitarian and other key stakeholders. These mechanisms will be enhanced to ensure the provision of coordinated support to the field and conduct joined-up analysis and planning.

41. Coordination mechanisms would be put in place to ensure that the Assistant Secretaries-General with regional responsibilities adequately address cross-cutting and cross-regional matters.

Standing Principals' Group

42. In order to provide leadership for all strategic, political and operational functions and ensure a coherent "whole-of-pillar" approach across the peace and security pillar, a Standing Principals' Group of the Under-Secretaries-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and for Peace Operations would be established under my chairmanship. The Group would ensure coordination, communication and coherence in the implementation of peace and security priorities, support managerial and leadership coherence, both at Headquarters and in the field, and support senior leadership appointments in missions. It would also provide a high-level entry point for the development and human rights pillars and other entities. Interaction with the operational support and management departments would be facilitated at the level of the Standing Principals' Group. Appropriate mechanisms and procedures would be put in place to ensure coordination and collaboration among all the Assistant Secretaries-General in the two departments, as well as with the relevant Assistant Secretaries-General in the envisaged global operational support and management departments.

V. Link to global operational support and management departments

43. The close cooperation of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations with the two new departments proposed within the management reform stream, namely, the Department of Management, Strategy, Policy and Compliance and the Department of Operational Support, will be essential. This will be achieved through the representation of the peace and security pillar on the Management Client Board, as well as dedicated support capacities. Appropriate field-focused policies, procedures, mechanisms and structures will be established between the pillar and the Department of Management, Strategy, Policy and Compliance and the Department of Operational Support to ensure coherence in all aspects related to the field.

VI. Gender

44. As acknowledged in the global study on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and in Council resolution 2242 (2015), additional efforts are needed to ensure adequate attention is given to priorities under the women, peace and security agenda, in particular women's meaningful participation in all peace efforts at all stages of the conflict cycle. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations would maintain their respective specialized gender capacities and functions with a view to ensuring the mainstreaming of gender at all levels and in all areas of the Organization's work. These dedicated capacities will work closely with each other and with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) to provide technical, political and policy expertise to the preventive diplomacy and peacemaking engagements and the gender units of peacekeeping and special political missions, as called for in the global study. Mechanisms will be put in place to ensure the coordination of efforts, the participation of gender expertise and capacity in all mission assessments and their rapid deployment to mission and non-mission contexts at critical periods, including during transitions.

VII. Priority areas

45. In addition, I will propose a number of measures to enhance certain priority areas that are essential for the success of my reform proposal, including to ensure coherence and coordination across the peace and security pillar. Work is ongoing, for example, to identify additional ways to create greater coherence among the various components of the two departments, such as in the specialized capacities and services in the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Peacebuilding Support Office. The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions and other relevant specialized capacities, including the electoral assistance, mediation support and peacebuilding components of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, will deepen their collaboration, leading to a more integrated peacebuilding approach. These specialized capacities will serve all missions, as well as non-mission settings. Policy, guidance, knowledge management, evaluations and training responsibilities across the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Peacebuilding Support Office would also be adjusted to reflect the new structure.

46. I also foresee that a number of priority areas to support conflict prevention, crisis response and sustaining peace will require particular attention, such as analysis, planning, partnerships and communications.

47. The establishment of the single regional political-operational structure will help to enhance conflict analysis by allowing staff to dedicate more time to analysing peace and security trends in a particular country or region. In addition, joined-up, system-wide analysis of a particular context and of key stakeholders is a critical first step to more coherent strategies, political engagement and more effective prevention, programming and, where mandated, operations. That will boost the ability to develop a shared and comprehensive understanding of a situation and of drivers and root causes of violent conflict. Analysis must also be reinforced with better links to the rest of the system and greater coherence with the development and human rights pillars.

48. Planning will be reinforced by the establishment of the single political-operational structure, including through the development of regional strategies. At the same time, greater attention should be directed at building planning capacities, in

particular with regard to integrated planning and system-wide engagement, as well as more proactive engagement with Member States and key partners during analysis and planning processes.

49. The United Nations must embrace a dual role as one partner responding politically and operationally alongside others, and as an enabler and facilitator for others to play their role. This should be achieved through enhanced triangular cooperation and deepened ties with regional and subregional organizations, in particular the African Union and subregional African organizations, as well as other partners such as the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Pacific Islands Forum. Partnership agreements with regional organizations will frame enhanced cooperation at all levels. The Assistant Secretaries-General with regional responsibilities will provide an entry point for the political and operational engagement of regional partners with the Secretariat. There is also the need for more consistent engagement with other partners, including national and local actors and other key stakeholders, as well as women's groups and youth organizations, civil society, the private sector, academia and think tanks. The World Bank and other international financial institutions are also priority partners in the light of their important and growing role in support of prevention and sustaining peace. A key example of the joint work is the recent United Nations-World Bank study entitled *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*.

50. Effective strategic communications are required to build stronger relations with partners and stakeholders, dispel misconceptions, manage expectations, protect the safety and security of United Nations personnel and improve awareness of the work and contributions of the United Nations. They are a core element of United Nations diplomacy and successful peace operations. Going forward, the Organization will be much more innovative and strategic in utilizing this tool better.

51. There is also a vital need to address the current fragmentation of funding streams for activities to sustain peace, which weakens the ability of the United Nations to effectively, coherently and comprehensively engage, at an early stage and throughout the conflict cycle, in the relevant actions to prevent or resolve conflict, build peace and facilitate recovery and development. In the resolutions on the review of the peacebuilding architecture, I was mandated to provide options on increasing, restructuring and better prioritizing funding dedicated to United Nations peacebuilding activities, including through assessed and voluntary contributions; this will be addressed in detail in my forthcoming report on sustaining peace. I have already called on Member States to significantly strengthen the Peacebuilding Fund as an instrument to help sustain peace in the field and to catalyse the United Nations system in working together better and more effectively. More detailed proposals in that respect will be provided in that report.

VIII. Changing how we work

52. The goals of prioritizing prevention and sustaining peace, enhancing the effectiveness and coherence of peacekeeping operations and special political missions and facilitating a more coherent, nimble and effective peace and security pillar, aligned more closely with the development and human rights pillars, cannot be achieved through structural reforms alone. Non-structural factors, including working methods and the overall work culture of the Organization, are key to realizing my vision of a United Nations that is ready and able to change. Structures can serve as enablers of these essential elements, but cannot, in and of themselves, deliver them. Above all, staff and management must commit to and be appraised on their delivery

of a whole-of-pillar and cross-pillar approach. In this respect, managers will be expected to enhance collaboration in thematic areas across the Secretariat and different agencies, funds and programmes. Building on lessons learned from successful models of cooperation, opportunities will be explored in other relevant areas to provide consistent and integrated support to all field presences through appropriate joined-up arrangements across the pillars.

53. In line with my strategy to achieve gender parity, greater efforts will be made to promote gender parity, in particular at senior levels, both at Headquarters and in the field, including by actively preparing and supporting mid-level United Nations career professionals, notably women, for leadership positions in the field and at Headquarters. I remain deeply committed to both achieving gender parity and creating an enabling and supportive work environment that addresses unconscious bias and structural impediments to promote the full participation of women in all areas of work of the Organization.

54. I envisage a number of other concrete changes in the way the peace and security pillar works on a daily basis. Burdensome business practices that hamper decision-making and delivery will be addressed, as will transaction costs that slow the Organization down and increase costs. Routine processes must be significantly streamlined and simplified in order to enhance capacity and space for tackling pressing departmental priorities in a more effective manner, as well as dedicating more time to learning. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations would work together to identify key mechanisms, procedures and processes that can be standardized and shared.

55. The Organization must also become less risk averse when it comes to innovation. Innovation must not be for its own sake; it must have a real impact on the Organization's field presences and the people and countries it serves. Change and innovation must be encouraged, and managers should motivate their staff to find innovative solutions to challenges and recognize this in their evaluations. To improve the lives of the people it serves, the Organization must continuously generate and test new ideas, building on lessons learned from the past. It must simplify overly bureaucratic approaches and mindsets that constrain it, and it must constantly challenge the status quo.

56. Greater leveraging of technology, including what is already available within the system, must be vigorously pursued to enhance analysis, the sharing of data and collaboration. To this end, the departments will identify shared technology platforms that will enable them to interact more productively on specific topics and foster more collaborative working methods.

57. I am also working to change the system's organizational culture. This includes my efforts to strengthen coordination across the United Nations system, as promoted by the establishment of the Executive Committee, as well as the changes I have made to my Executive Office.

58. Enhanced leadership, accountability and performance management, including in the implementation of the whole-of-pillar approach and cross-pillar collaboration, will be critical to success in this regard. The establishment of the Executive Committee in January 2017 represents an important step towards greater cross-pillar coherence and accountability. I am certain that the addition of the Standing Principals' Group for the peace and security pillar will further improve efforts in this direction. In my report on shifting the management paradigm in the United Nations, I proposed to put in place a robust performance management and evaluation system that holds leadership and staff at Headquarters and in the field accountable for delivery and for upholding United Nations norms and values.

59. To enhance leadership capacities and further strengthen the organizational culture, I intend to develop a 360-degree evaluation mechanism and to place greater emphasis on investing in staff training and development. This includes offering leadership coaching for key managerial personnel and increasing the opportunities for mid-level staff to benefit from leadership and management training.

60. I will take appropriate steps to strengthen management delegation to and within departments, as well as to the field, and to promote a more participatory and less hierarchical culture. Steps will be taken to delegate greater authority to different levels, as appropriate. Workplace decisions must be transparent and information should be shared widely, including with field presences, as relevant.

IX. Conclusion

61. My proposals are aimed at constituting a more coherent and effective peace and security pillar that is better equipped to support Member States in addressing the disparate challenges we face in the world of today. If approved, these reforms would introduce significant changes. Thus, it is my intention to closely monitor their implementation and assess their impact on the Organization's work and ability to deliver, with a view to making the necessary adjustments and changes in consultation with Member States, as appropriate.

62. A rigorous change management process will be key in implementing these proposals. Under the overall direction of the Chef de Cabinet, the change management process will be led jointly by the Under-Secretaries-General for Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations and the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support. Expert external assistance on change management may be called upon, as needed. The team will also engage with the change teams in other areas of reform.

63. The support and commitment of Member States to these reforms will be crucial throughout this process. I have thus far been encouraged by the strong support voiced by the membership for my proposals. In particular, I appreciate the strong backing and commitment to my vision for prevention, and am confident that the current proposals will significantly improve the quality of the United Nations support to Member States in addressing today's peace and security challenges. The proposals contained in the present report are meant to be cost-neutral and will not require any reallocation of resources from other pillars or areas to peace and security.

64. **The General Assembly is requested:**

(a) **To take note of the report of the Secretary-General and endorse his vision for reforming the Secretariat's peace and security architecture;**

(b) **To request the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at the second part of the resumed seventy-second session a comprehensive report on the implementation of his peace and security architecture reform proposals;**

(c) **To support the creation of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations, and to request the Secretary-General, in the context of the above-mentioned comprehensive report, to provide detailed information on the functions, structure and staffing requirements of the new structure.**

United Nations A/72/526–S/2017/848

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 34 (a)
Prevention of armed conflict: prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 6 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to share with you some thoughts as a follow-up to the meeting that the Security Council held on 4 October 2017 on the Syrian chemical file. The discussion once again proved that all Council members firmly condemn the use of chemical weapons wherever and by whomsoever and believe that those responsible should be identified and held to account. This was exactly the purpose of the establishment of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) fact-finding mission and the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism.

The Council members unanimously supported an independent, impartial, professional and objective investigation of the alleged chemical incidents in Syria. On the other hand, some legitimate questions were raised by a number of delegations, in particular with regard to the episode in Khan Shaykhun (Idlib governorate) on 4 April 2017.

From April to June 2017, the fact-finding mission conducted an investigation of the chemical incident in Khan Shaykhun without visiting the site. The fact-finding mission did not thoroughly observe the basic principle of chain of custody and drew its conclusions by interviewing some witnesses whose presence at the site on 4 April was never credibly confirmed. The mission preferred not to go to Sha'irat airbase, where, as was repeatedly claimed, sarin allegedly used in Khan Shaykhun was stored. We were informed in the course of the Security Council meeting that there was a chance for the mission to visit the site of the incident in Khan Shaykhun. All security guarantees were given by the armed groups in control of the site, but the mission did not seize that opportunity for unexplained reasons.

The Joint Investigative Mechanism now has a chance to avoid repeating the fact-finding mission's flaws as it is preparing to send its team to Sha'irat airbase at the invitation of the Syrian Government. We believe it to be in our common interest that this visit be productive in terms of leading to the determination of accurate facts and data. One of the primary purposes of such an inspection should be to determine whether sarin was stored at the airbase.

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No less important for the Joint Investigative Mechanism is to make all possible efforts to visit the site of the incident in Khan Shaykhun pending the security situation, the solution to which, as we know now, could be found.

Looking forward to the final report of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, we express the hope that the Mechanism will be able to strictly adhere to appropriate methodology and avoid hasty and groundless conclusions not supported by robust evidence, as well as factual, detailed and comprehensive justification. All possible leads and scenarios should be meticulously examined. We expect that all necessary information will be provided in the report on who collected the evidence and where and by what means. It is crucial that the principle of presumption of innocence be observed in the course of investigation. There should be no place for any kind of prejudgment.

Please find enclosed herewith a non-paper with some Russian assessments of the fact-finding mission investigation (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Vassily **Nebenzia**

Annex to the letter dated 6 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Non-paper

The Joint Investigative Mechanism is studying the circumstances of two chemical incidents in Syria to identify their perpetrators. One of them occurred in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. First, we find it necessary to point to several setbacks in the activity of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) fact-finding mission to help the Mechanism to avoid the latter's mistakes.

The fundamental flaw in the work of the fact-finding mission was non-compliance with the key principle of chain of custody to preserve the integrity of material evidence. There is no certainty that the material evidence received by OPCW personnel has any relation to Khan Shaykhun. Witnesses were picked out mostly by opposition groups and related organizations.

Another serious flaw was that the fact-finding mission carried out its investigation remotely, without visiting the place of the incident. In particular, there was no justification for the refusal to visit Khan Shaykhun and the Sha'irat airbase, where sarin or a sarin-like substance used in Khan Shaykhun was being stored as some alleged. The Syrian authorities guaranteed free and safe access to this facility for OPCW personnel. The security situation, as we know now, also allowed a visit to Khan Shaykhun.

The fact-finding mission established that sarin or a sarin-like substance was used, but no evidence was provided that an aerial bomb was dropped there. Not a single fragment can be seen on the numerous photos and videos. At the same time, something similar to a compressed metallic pipe can be noticed in the crater, but there is no trace of an aerial bomb.

The work done by the fact-finding mission cannot be considered as solid and complete. The Joint Investigative Mechanism should take into account the findings from the mission's report but thoroughly double-check them. Many other questions to the mission on its methods of work, the way evidence was collected, as well as ignored, and conclusions that were made by it, remained unanswered or unattended to. The Mechanism will have to rely on its own investigation and sources of information and collect additional evidence as stipulated in paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 2235 (2015).

We hope that some recommendations will help the Joint Investigative Mechanism to conduct a comprehensive, professional and objective investigation to identify those responsible on the basis of undeniable proofs:

1. There is a need to consider all leads without exception, including that of a staged character of the chemical incident.

2. The closest attention should be paid to clarifying the key question of how sarin or a sarin-like substance was used. Without such clarification, it is impossible to identify those responsible.

3. As provided for in paragraph 7 of resolution 2235 (2015), the Joint Investigative Mechanism should fill the gaps which became evident as the fact-finding mission concluded its investigation. To that end the Mechanism experts should visit the Sha'irat airbase and take and analyse samples, without which it will not be possible to identify whether sarin was stored there.

4. According to available information, the crater was paved with asphalt in mid-April, which looked like a deliberate elimination of the material evidence. The Mechanism experts should carefully examine the existing photos and videos to identify the nature of the crater.

Russian specialists came to the conclusion that the size and geometrical form of the crater, as well as the direction of asphalt curves around it (inward, not outward), indicate that a container with sarin or a sarin-like substance was detonated right on the surface. Most likely an improvised explosive device was placed on the asphalt, while the container with sarin or a sarin-like substance held no more than one or two litres of poison gas.

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor T. Postol and the former United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission employee S. Ritter wrote articles on the incident, which are worth being looked at.

5. While examining the theory of an air bomb explosion, the Mechanism experts will have to explain the absence of its fragments and remains on the photos and videos.

6. What specifically needs to be substantiated is why the children on the photos, who allegedly suffered from the incident, have dilated eye pupils, while after contact with sarin they were supposed to be contracted.

It is easy to find many other mismatches, as mentioned in particular by the non-governmental organization Swedish Doctors for Human Rights.

Thus, there are serious grounds to assume that much of the evidence was fabricated and some hastily removed to hamper credible investigation.

7. To identify those involved, there is a need to gather information from alternative sources using various investigative skills, in particular in the fields of forensics and counter-terrorism.

8. We believe that the Joint Investigative Mechanism should carefully look at the information on preparations for chemical attacks by terrorists which Syria keeps sending to the Security Council on a regular basis. All possible leads should be considered to determine how toxic chemicals and precursors go to Syria, as well as how, where and by whom they are synthesized.

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 37
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Identical letters dated 9 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I write with reference to the reports circulated by certain Israeli parties, to the effect that Lieutenant Colonel Yahya al-Husayni of the Directorate of Intelligence is connected with Hizbullah, and that the latter is using his position in the Lebanese Army for so-called terrorist activities on the border. That information is completely mistaken. Its sole purpose is to tarnish the image of the Lebanese Army and to portray it as the party responsible for violating international law and the provisions of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), in order to help Israel in its ongoing endeavour to justify its violations of Lebanese sovereignty by air, sea and land.

My country's Government respects its obligations under the relevant international resolutions. On its behalf, I call on the Security Council to condemn those claims and allegations in the strongest terms possible, and to prevail on Israel to stop violating Lebanese sovereignty by air, sea and land and fulfil all of its obligations under Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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United Nations A/72/528*

General Assembly

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13 October 2017

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Seventy-second session
Agenda item 14
Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields

Letter dated 6 October 2017 from the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the document entitled "Responding to refugees and migrants: 20 action points", which is the official input of the Holy See for the consultations and intergovernmental negotiations related to the global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration (see annex).

Grounded in the Catholic Church's experience and reflection, the 20 action points have been developed after intensive consultations throughout the world and were specifically approved by Pope Francis.

I would be very grateful if you could have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly under agenda item 14.

(*Signed*) Archbishop Bernardito **Auza**
Permanent Observer of the Holy See

* Reissued for technical reasons on 27 October 2017.

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Annex to the letter dated 6 October 2017 from the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Responding to refugees and migrants: 20 action points

For centuries, people on the move have received the assistance and special pastoral attention of the Catholic Church. Today, facing the largest movement of displaced peoples in recent memory, the Church feels compelled to continue this work in solidarity with them and in cooperation with the international community.

While massive numbers of people have been forced to leave their homes owing to persecution, violence, natural disasters and the scourge of poverty, migration should nevertheless be recognized not as a new phenomenon, but rather as a natural human response to crisis and a testament to the innate desire of every human being for happiness and a better life. This reality, with its important cultural and spiritual dimensions, is having a significant impact on attitudes and reactions all over the world.

Even amidst the current crisis, experience teaches that effective, shared responses are available. The Church looks forward to working together with the international community to promote and adopt such measures to protect the dignity, rights and freedoms of all persons currently on the move, including forced migrants, victims of human trafficking, asylum seekers, refugees and internally displaced persons.

The United Nations processes to produce global compacts, one on safe, orderly and regular migration, and the other on refugees, are a unique opportunity to respond together through international cooperation and shared responsibility.

The Church has already taken a stand on many of the issues which will be included in the global compacts and, drawing on its diverse and long-standing pastoral experience, would like to contribute actively to the two processes. To support this contribution, the Vatican's Migrants and Refugees Section (Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development), consulting with various bishops' conferences and Catholic non-governmental organizations working in the field, has prepared the following 20 action points. They have been approved by the Holy Father. They are grounded in the Church's best practices responding to the needs of migrants and refugees at the grassroots level. They do not exhaust the Church's teaching on migrants and refugees, but provide practical considerations which Catholic and other advocates can use, add to and develop in their dialogue with Governments towards the global compacts.

The 20 points advocate effective and proven measures which together constitute an integral response to the current challenges. In accordance with Pope Francis's teaching, the points are grouped under four headings: to welcome, to protect, to promote and to integrate. Each is an active verb and a call to action. Starting from what is currently possible, their ultimate goal is the building of an inclusive and sustainable common home for all. Our sincere hope is that these action points will provide welcome guidance to policymakers and everyone concerned with improving the situation of migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons, especially those who are most vulnerable.

Empirical evidence shows that migration is more and more mixed. This makes it difficult to maintain a clear-cut distinction between migrants and refugees. Often their needs are very similar if not identical. Accordingly, let the drafting and negotiating strive for the greatest possible harmony between the two global

compacts. Moreover, both compacts should have a real impact on people's lives and should therefore include targets and goals to be met as well as reporting mechanisms.

The Migrants and Refugees Section offers the 20 action points as a contribution to the drafting, negotiation and adoption of the global compacts on migrants and on refugees by the end of 2018. Guided by Pope Francis, the Section stands behind the principles embodied in these points and looks forward to working with the international community towards their inclusion in the global compacts.

I. To welcome: enhancing safe and legal channels for migrants and refugees

Migration should be safe, legal and orderly, and the decision to migrate should be voluntary. With this in mind, the following action points are suggested.

1. Encourage States to ban arbitrary and collective expulsions. The "non-refoulement" principle should always be respected. This principle is based on the individual situation of the person and not on how "safe" a country is generally claimed to be. States should avoid using safe country lists, as such lists often fail to meet the refugee's needs for protection.

2. Encourage States and all actors involved to expand the number and range of alternative legal pathways for safe and voluntary migration and resettlement, with full respect for the principle of non-refoulement. Examples of such avenues would include:

(a) Adopt the practice of extending humanitarian visas, or if already present, expand their use as a national policy priority;

(b) Encourage the wider use of student visas, including for apprenticeship and internship programmes as well as all levels of formal education;

(c) Adopt humanitarian corridor programmes that grant legal entry with a humanitarian visa to people in particularly vulnerable situations, including those forced to flee conflict and natural disasters;

(d) Adopt legislation which enables local integration through community and private sponsorship by citizens, communities and organizations;

(e) Adopt resettlement policies for refugees or, if already present in the legal framework, increase the number of refugees resettled on a scale that would make it possible for the annual resettlement needs identified by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to be met;

(f) Provide family reunification visas or, if already available, expand the number of such visas issued, particularly for the reunification of all family members (including grandparents, siblings and grandchildren);

(g) Adopt national policies which permit those forced to flee armed conflict, persecution or widespread violence in their countries of origin to be received immediately, even if temporarily, by neighbouring States through, for example, the granting of temporary protection status;

(h) A responsible and dignified welcome of migrants and refugees

begins by offering them decent and appropriate shelter. The enormous gathering together of persons seeking asylum and of refugees has not produced positive results. Instead, these gatherings have created new situations of vulnerability and hardship. More widespread programmes of

> welcome, already initiated in different places, seem to favour a personal encounter and allow for greater quality of service and increased guarantees of success.[1]

3. Encourage States to adopt a national security perspective that fully takes into account the security and human rights of all migrants, asylum seekers and refugees entering their territory. For example:

(a) Provide training in international human rights law and international refugee law to public officials and law enforcement officers who work in border areas;

(b) Adopt national policies which respond first to the needs and vulnerabilities of those seeking admission, including access to basic services, before addressing an applicant's legal status;

(c) Adopt national security policies that prioritize the safety and protection of refugees and asylum seekers fleeing armed conflict, persecution or widespread violence to find safety quickly by ensuring an expeditious screening and admission process;

(d) Adopt national policies which prefer alternatives to the detention of those seeking access to the territory.

II. To protect: ensuring migrants' and refugees' rights and dignity

The Church insists on the importance of taking a holistic and integrated approach, with a focus on the centrality of the human person. A holistic approach remains, indeed, the best way to detect and overcome harmful stereotypes and to avoid stigmatizing anyone with respect to a few specific aspects, to take account of all dimensions and fundamental aspects of the person as a whole.

> The proper implementation of human rights becomes truly beneficial for migrants, as well as for the sending and receiving countries. The measures suggested are not a mere concession to migrants. They are in the interest of migrants, host societies and the international community at large. Promoting and respecting the human rights of migrants and their dignity ensures that everyone's rights and dignity in society are fully respected.[2]

Migrants, asylum seekers and refugees should be received as human beings, in dignity and with full respect for their human rights, regardless of their migratory status. While it is the right of every State to manage and control its borders, migrants and refugees must be received in conformity with applicable obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international refugee law. The more alternative and legal pathways are available to the migrant and refugee, the less likely they are to be taken advantage of by criminal networks and to find themselves victims of human trafficking, or victims of exploitation and abuse in the context of the smuggling of migrants.

The right to life is the most basic guarantee of civil and political freedom. Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that "[e]very human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by

[1] Pope Francis, address to participants at the International Forum on Migration and Peace, 21 February 2017.

[2] Statement of the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva at the twenty-ninth session of the Human Rights Council interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Geneva, 15 June 2015.

law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life".[3] Every response to migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, particularly in search and rescue operations, should be directed primarily to ensure and protect the right to life of all, regardless of their status. With this in mind, the following action points are proposed:

4. Encourage States with significant labour migrant outflows to adopt policies and practices which provide protections for citizens choosing to emigrate. For example:

(a) Create national pre-departure information systems and training, which alert and educate citizens and employers, as well as public officials and law enforcement officers who work in border areas, to identify signs of forced labour or trafficking;

(b) Require national regulation and certification of employment recruiters;

(c) Establish, at the ministerial level, a department dedicated to diaspora affairs;

(d) Adopt national policies that protect the interests of and assist diaspora and migrant communities abroad, including through consular protection and legal services.

5. Encourage States with significant labour migrant inflows to adopt national policies which protect against exploitation, forced labour, or trafficking. Some examples would be:

(a) Enact legislation which forbids employers from withholding the passports and other forms of identification from their employees;

(b) Enact national policies which provide foreign residents with access to justice, regardless of their migratory status, allowing them to report human rights abuses and violence without fear of reprisal, including detention and deportation;

(c) Enact national policies which allow migrants to open private, personal bank accounts that also permit direct deposits by employers;

(d) Adopt national minimum wage laws which require the regular and predictable payment of wages, at least on a monthly basis.

6. Encourage States to adopt national policies which enable migrants, asylum seekers and refugees to make the best use of their skills and capacities, in order to better contribute to their own and their communities' well-being. For example:

(a) Grant refugees and asylum seekers freedom of movement and provide work permits as well as travel documents which allow for their return to the host State, particularly for those who find employment in other States;

(b) Adopt programmes engaging local communities in hosting small groups of asylum seekers in addition to larger reception and identification centres;

(c) Enact legislation which allows asylum seekers, refugees and migrants the ability to open bank accounts, establish enterprises and conduct financial transactions;

(d) Enact national policies which allow migrants, asylum seekers and refugees to access and use telecommunications, such as the Internet or SIM cards for mobile telephones, without burdensome procedures or fees;

[3] See General Assembly resolution 2200 (XXI) A, annex.

(c) Enact national policies which allow repatriated and returning migrants and refugees to have swift access to employment opportunities in their countries of origin, thus encouraging their reintegration into society.

7. Encourage States to comply with their obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child when enacting domestic legislation to address the vulnerable situation of unaccompanied children or minors separated from their family. For example:

(a) Adopt alternatives to mandatory detention, which is never in the best interest of the child, no matter their migratory status;

(b) Provide foster care or guardianship for unaccompanied children or minors while they are separated from their family;

(c) Establish separate processing centres for families, minors and adults.

8. Encourage States to comply with their obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child when dealing with all migrant minors and recommend the following actions, among others:

(a) Adopt procedures that guarantee legal protections for minors approaching the age of majority. In particular, enact legislation that preserves their legal status and prevents them from becoming undocumented and thus subject to detention and deportation;

(b) Adopt procedures that permit minors who are close to the age of majority to continue their education without interruption;

(c) Adopt policies that require the registration of all births, providing each newborn with a birth certificate.

9. Encourage States to adopt national policies that provide equal access to education for migrant, asylum seeker and refugee learners of all levels. For example:

(a) Enact national or regional policies which provide migrants and refugees with access to primary and secondary education, no matter their migratory status;

(b) Enact policies which provide that the primary and secondary education to which migrants and refugees have access meets the same standards of education received by citizens.

10. Encourage States to adopt legislation which provides migrants and refugees with access to adequate social protections. For example:

(a) Enact legislation which ensures the right to health of migrants and refugees, including access to primary health-care services, regardless of their migratory status and immediately upon arrival;

(b) Enact legislation that grants access to national pension schemes and that guarantees the portability of social security coverage and benefits between and among countries to prevent migrants and refugees from losing entitlements owing to their migration status.

11. Encourage States to enact legislation to prevent migrants and refugees from becoming "stateless". In particular:

(a) Enact legislation granting adequate protection and standards of treatment in respect of rights and freedoms as established by international conventions addressing statelessness and human rights treaties and provisions relevant to the right to a nationality;

(b) Enact legal and policy reforms that are necessary to address statelessness effectively, working in the four areas of statelessness — identification, prevention, reduction and protection — and aiming at granting citizenship to children at birth.

III. To promote: advancing migrants' and refugees' integral human development

At the present time, the average duration of exile for those who have fled armed conflict is 17 years. For labour migrants as well, the time away from home can amount to many years. Hosting States, rather than providing merely emergency responses and basic services, should assure structures which allow those staying long-term to develop as human beings and to contribute to the development of the host country. Moreover, since a basic principle of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals is to "leave no one behind", the international community should take care to include refugees, asylum seekers and labour migrants in their development plans. The following action points are suggested:

12. Encourage States to enact legislation that enables the recognition, transfer and further development of the formal skills of all migrants, asylum seekers and refugees residing in the host country. For example:

(a) Enact policies which provide access to tertiary education as well as support for qualified migrants, asylum seekers and refugees;

(b) Enact policies which provide equal access to apprenticeship and internship programmes for qualified migrants, asylum seekers and refugees on the same basis as for citizens;

(c) Enact policies which facilitate the assessment, validation and recognition of academic and vocational education, including higher education, of migrants and refugees through, for example, inter-university arrangements as well as bilateral and multilateral agreements.

13. Encourage States to adopt laws, policies and practices which facilitate the local integration of migrants, asylum seekers and refugee populations. For example:

(a) Where they do not already exist, enact laws that recognize the right of asylum seekers and refugees to freedom of movement and freedom to choose their place of residence;

(b) Where they do not already exist, enact laws that recognize the right of asylum seekers and refugees to work at the time of registration with appropriate national authorities;

(c) Adopt policies which provide access to classes and training in the local language and customs and provide for the printing of public notices and information in those languages most common among migrant and refugee populations within the host country.

14. Encourage States to adopt policies and practices which promote and preserve the integrity and well-being of the family regardless of migratory status. For example:

(a) Enact laws which allow for the reunification of refugees and migrants with their families and that recognize the right of these family members to work. A minimum level of income, or proof of the ability to provide financial support, should not be a requirement for the reunification of minors with their parents;

(b) Enact laws which expand the scope of family reunification policies to include all family members (including grandparents, siblings and grandchildren) in order to allow the entire family to remain united in the resettlement process;

(c) Enact policies which facilitate family tracing and reunification;

(d) Enact laws which prohibit and actively prevent the abuse of minor workers, ensuring that the work is safe and does not harm their health and well-being or jeopardize their educational opportunities.

15. Encourage States to adopt policies and practices that provide migrants, asylum seekers and refugees with special needs or vulnerabilities with the same opportunities as other disabled citizens. For example:

(a) Enact policies which provide all disabled persons with access to assistance devices for the disabled (for example, wheelchairs, guide dogs, hearing aids) regardless of migratory status;

(b) Enact policies which promote rapid access to special education or vocational training as well as health care for unaccompanied or separated minors who are disabled.

16. Encourage the international community to increase its share of development and emergency assistance to States which host and support large influxes of refugees and migrants fleeing armed conflict so all may benefit, regardless of migratory status. For example:

(a) Encourage donor States to tailor aid and assistance to include the development of medical, educational and social services infrastructure in hosting areas upon the arrival of the refugees and migrants, for example, paying for the construction of additional classrooms and funding teacher training where local capacity has been overwhelmed or exhausted;

(b) Encourage donor States to adopt policies that set aside a percentage of the direct assistance and allow access to the programmes and services provided to refugees and migrants, for the benefit of local families experiencing similar economic and social disadvantages.

17. Encourage States to adopt policies and practices that guarantee the freedom of religion, in both belief and practice, to all migrants and refugees regardless of their migratory status.

IV. To integrate: enriching communities through wider participation of migrants and refugees

The acceptance of migrants and refugees is an opportunity for new understanding and broader horizons, both on the part of those accepted, who have the responsibility to respect the values, traditions and laws of the community which takes them in, and on the part of the latter, which is called upon to acknowledge the beneficial contribution which each immigrant can make to the whole community. Both sides are mutually enriched by their interaction and the community as a whole is enhanced by a greater participation of all its members, both resident and migrants. This is also true for the migrant or refugee who chooses to return home. The following action points are suggested:

18. On the basis of the understanding that integration is neither assimilation nor incorporation, but a "two-way process," which is essentially rooted in the joint recognition of the other's cultural richness, encourage States to enact legislation which facilitates local integration. For example:

(a) Adopt laws and constitutional provisions aimed at granting citizenship at birth;

(b) Adopt laws which provide timely access to citizenship for all refugees;

(c) Adopt a rights- and needs-based approach to the granting of citizenship. Citizenship should not be contingent on economic status or the ownership of property;

(d) Adopt laws that grant citizenship without "new language requirements" for older applicants (over 50 years of age);

(e) Adopt laws which facilitate the legal migration of family members of foreign residents;

(f) Adopt laws which allow for the regularization of status for long-term residents of the host country.

19. Encourage States to adopt policies and programmes which actively promote a positive narrative on migrants and refugees and solidarity with them. For example:

(a) Provide subsidies to municipalities and faith-based communities to host events which showcase positive aspects of the culture of the members of the foreign community;

(b) Engage in public campaigns that identify and promote positive examples of individuals and groups hosting refugees and migrants and integrating them into their local communities;

(c) Require public announcements to be issued in the language spoken by large groups of migrants and refugees;

(d) Enact policies that promote hospitality within the local communities and which actively seek to welcome and integrate migrants into the local community.

20. When foreign nationals are forced to flee from violence or environmental crisis in the host country, they are often eligible for voluntary repatriation programmes or evacuation programmes. In these cases, the host State, donor States or the State of origin should be encouraged to adopt policies and procedures which facilitate the reintegration of returnees. For example:

(a) Increase donor funding for enhancing the infrastructure in areas of return or transition assistance for returning workers caught up in foreign crisis;

(b) Enact laws that recognize and allow for the transfer of educational or other credentials earned abroad by returning citizens and permit rapid access to labour markets for those with professional or vocational credentials (e.g., trained teachers, electricians, medical personnel and heavy equipment operators).

United Nations A/72/529–S/2017/853

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
12 October 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 44
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 10 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 9 October 2017, addressed to you by the Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Mehmet Dânâ (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Feridun H. **Sinirlioğlu**
Permanent Representative

17-18031 (E) 191017

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Annex to the letter dated 10 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

9 October 2017

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letters dated 1 September 2017 (A/71/1033-S/2017/749) and 2 October 2017 (A/72/506-S/2017/828) addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as documents of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, which yet again contain false assertions similar to those made in his previous letters. In order to set the record straight, I would like to bring the following to your kind attention.

At the outset, regarding the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. As for the false assertion regarding "illegally issued" notices to airmen, it must be underlined that activities within the Ercan advisory airspace that require notices to airmen are carried out by the relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in accordance with article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).

Similarly, the claims in the letters regarding Turkish Cypriot ports are also baseless, given the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, these claims ignore the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As to the repeated false allegations regarding Ercan Airport in the North, it should once again be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre and airport in North Cyprus have been providing regular, reliable and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island, in line with its isolation policy that has been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have taken place with the full knowledge and permission of the Civil Aviation Department of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control. Furthermore, I would like to stress that the allegation regarding the interference of radio frequencies is also totally baseless.

Moreover, the isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots, which the Greek Cypriot side attempts to perpetuate by encouraging the international community to deem all air and sea ports in Northern Cyprus "illegal", is in complete contravention of international law, as well as of the call made by the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his report to the Security Council dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437), in which he clearly stated, "I would hope they [members of the Security Council] can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of

isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)".

The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety meets all standards and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization, providing safe and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan Airport and using airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards, and necessary investments have been made to keep up with the developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan area control centre is in regular and close cooperation with the Ankara area control centre in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In 2016 alone, the number of passengers who used Ercan Airport amounted to 3,628,387, while this number is expected to be around 3,900,000 in 2017. Moreover, in 2016 27,109 planes used Ercan Airport for arrival and departure, and 210,789 planes used the Ercan advisory airspace; these numbers are expected to be around 28,080 and 225,000, respectively, in 2017. In that regard, it must also be stressed that the Turkish Cypriot side is committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety in full conformity with the Chicago Convention of 1944, and that it is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

Availing myself of the present opportunity, I would like to call upon the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue such counterproductive and outdated rhetoric. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations A/72/530

General Assembly

Distr.: General
13 October 2017
English
Original: Chinese and English

Seventy-second session
Agenda item 120
Implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations

Letter dated 9 October 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have been instructed to state the following positions of the Chinese Government on the Taiwan question:

1. There is only one China in the world, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory. The Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government representing the whole of China. The one-China principle has become a broad-based consensus of the international community. Although the mainland and Taiwan have not yet been reunited, the fact that the two sides belong to one and the same China remains unchanged, and will never change. The Chinese Government is committed to maintaining the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and promoting the welfare of people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. However, our firm position of adhering to the one-China principle and opposing "two Chinas", "one China, one Taiwan" and "Taiwan independence" will never change.

2. General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI), adopted in 1971, thoroughly resolved the issue of China's representation at the United Nations in political, legal and procedural terms. The specialized agencies of the United Nations have also resolved the issue of China's representation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and resolution 2758 (XXVI). The one-China principle must be observed when it comes to any Taiwan-related issues in the United Nations system, including the United Nations Secretariat.

3. The United Nations and its specialized agencies are intergovernmental organizations composed only of sovereign States. As part of China, Taiwan's participation in international organizations must be handled in accordance with the one-China principle. A very small number of countries, in disregard of the fact that Taiwan is part of China, have trumpeted Taiwan's so-called "participation" in the United Nations and its specialized agencies. This is unacceptable. No matter the means or excuses used, such moves are extremely damaging as they constitute a brazen attempt to create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" in the world, thus blatantly challenging the one-China principle and violating resolution 2758 (XXVI). We strongly oppose any attempts aimed at creating "two Chinas" or "one

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China, one Taiwan" and at undermining the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.

4. People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the same community of shared blood and future. The Chinese Government places great emphasis on the well-being of the 23 million Taiwan compatriots and is always committed to safeguarding their legitimate rights and interests. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was formulated under the framework of the United Nations and is led by Member States. The implementation of the 2030 Agenda must abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter, relevant norms of international law and the one-China principle. China will continue to comprehensively implement the 2030 Agenda and stay committed to promoting the development interests and well-being of all Chinese people. If the Taiwan authorities truly care about the interests of Taiwan compatriots, it should earnestly return to the one-China principle and the "1992 Consensus".

5. Any act of playing up the Taiwan question at the United Nations is in essence an attempt to undermine China's State sovereignty. It is not conducive to cross-Strait peace and stability or the well-being of the people of Taiwan. The Chinese Government hopes that the countries concerned will do more to contribute to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and refrain from acts that harm the interests of China and hurt the feelings of the Chinese people. We are convinced that the Chinese Government and people will continue to have the understanding and support of the United Nations and its Member States in its effort to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity, promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and achieve the great cause of peaceful reunification.

I have the honour to request that the present letter be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 120.

(*Signed*) **Wu Haitao**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative of the
People's Republic of China to the United Nations

United Nations A/72/531

General Assembly

Distr.: General
12 October 2017

Original: English

Seventy-second session
Agenda item 8
General debate

Letter dated 10 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the response by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the address made by the Vice-President of the Republic of Argentina, during the general debate at the seventy-second session of the General Assembly (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 8.

(*Signed*) Gholamali **Khoshroo**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-18061 (E) 171017

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Annex to the letter dated 10 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Remarks in response to the Vice-President of the Republic of Argentina during the general debate at the seventy-second session of the General Assembly

The Vice-President of the Republic of Argentina, during her address to the General Assembly on Wednesday, 20 September 2017, referenced a request made by Argentina to the Islamic Republic of Iran for cooperation in clarifying and shedding light on the 1994 bombing in Buenos Aires. In this regard, we would like to highlight the following points:

- The Islamic Republic of Iran unequivocally condemns all acts of terrorism committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes. By the same token, the Islamic Republic of Iran has always condemned the terrorist act of the bombing in Buenos Aires and expressed its sympathy with the families of the victims of the incident.
- The Islamic Republic of Iran has, time and again, rejected any involvement by any of its citizens in that terrorist act. We believe that by falsely accusing citizens of other countries, some officials of the Argentinean judiciary have tried to smokescreen their failure to track and punish the true perpetrators. Despite the fact that no credible evidence has been provided to indicate the involvement of any Iranian national in that terrorist act, Iran has been ready, as a sign of good will and in the hope that some light will be shed on this case, to cooperate with the Argentinean Government and judiciary to bring the perpetrators to justice. The memorandum of understanding signed between the two countries in January 2013 is proof of this approach. Unfortunately, the constructive approach taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran has not been duly reciprocated by Argentina.
- As justice has long been hindered in this case, while reaffirming its readiness to engage constructively with the Argentinean authorities, Iran hopes that they will concentrate their efforts on removing their internal obstacles on the path to putting this case on the right track.

United Nations A/72/532

General Assembly

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13 October 2017

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Seventy-second session
Agenda item 124
United Nations reform: measures and proposals

Letter dated 11 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I am pleased to transmit the Political Declaration for United Nations Reform, which was presented at a high-level event on 18 September (see annex).

The Declaration is an expression of robust support for your leadership in initiating effective, meaningful reform to make the United Nations fit for purpose, and is signed by 132 Member States. It was co-sponsored by the following Member States: Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, the Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovakia, Thailand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay; and endorsed by those in the attached list. We have collectively pledged our support in making your reform priorities a reality for the United Nations and wish you great success in your efforts.

We request that you circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 124.

(*Signed*) Nikki R. **Haley**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-18138 (E) 131017

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Annex to the letter dated 11 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Political Declaration for UN Reform High Level Event[1]

We thank Secretary-General Guterres for acting on his commitments to develop a robust reform agenda in areas of peace and security, development, and management. We, representing the undersigned Member States of the United Nations, hereby declare our commitment to the principles outlined herein to support the Secretary-General's leadership and transparency to initiate effective, meaningful reform to make the United Nations fit for purpose.

First, we declare our confidence in the Secretary-General's reform initiatives and encourage him to lead organizational reform.

Second, we commit to strengthening partnership and trust between and among Member States and the Secretariat to support reform efforts for a more effective and efficient Organization.

Third, we commit to supporting the Secretary-General to advance stronger collaboration across the United Nations system for improved mandate delivery.

Fourth, we encourage the Secretary-General to pursue impactful and field-centric management reforms.

Fifth, we commit to supporting the Secretary-General's progress in strengthening the United Nations system's accountability framework through enhancing transparency, strengthening oversight, and aligning authority with responsibility.

Sixth, we commit to reducing mandate duplication, redundancy, and overlap, including among the main organs of the United Nations.

Seventh, we commit to supporting the Secretary-General in developing human resources management policies that enable the Organization to continue to attract, develop, and retain high-performing staff members, and to promote gender parity and geographic diversity.

Eighth, we support the Secretary-General in strengthening the Organization's planning and budget functions to provide greater transparency and predictability on required resources.

Ninth, we support the Secretary-General in making concrete changes in the United Nations system to better align its work on humanitarian response, development, and sustaining peace initiatives.

Tenth, we recognize that each country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development, and we further recognize the role of the United Nations in providing a platform for partnership to enable global sustainable development.

[1] This Declaration is not legally binding and does not affect the signatories' existing obligations under applicable international and domestic law. Rather, the signatures below reflect the high-level political commitments of the Member States represented.

Delegations signatory to the Political Declaration for United Nations Reform

Djibouti

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Jordan

Saint Lucia

Ukraine

Spain

Slovakia

Canada

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Benin

Uganda

Vanuatu

Morocco

Yemen

Luxembourg

Republic of Korea

Montenegro

Azerbaijan

Hungary

Slovenia

Malta

Sudan

Palau

Maldives

Germany

Greece

Tuvalu

Poland

Belgium

Czechia

Burkina Faso

Albania

Estonia

Georgia

Philippines

Andorra

Finland

Monaco

Lithuania

Israel

Kenya

Liberia

Uzbekistan

United Arab Emirates

Somalia

Burundi

Netherlands

New Zealand

Colombia

Italy

Australia

Thailand

Brunei

Equatorial Guinea

Republic of Moldova

Panama

Senegal

Peru

Nigeria

Sri Lanka

Tunisia

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bangladesh

Romania

Latvia

Qatar

Mexico

Tonga

Marshall Islands

Uruguay

Algeria

Cyprus

Iraq

Austria

Indonesia

Namibia

Kuwait

Honduras

Malaysia

Bahrain

Japan

Myanmar

Switzerland

Seychelles

Liechtenstein

San Marino

Croatia

Bulgaria

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Kazakhstan

Portugal

Paraguay

Turkey

Denmark

Dominican Republic

Norway

Sweden

Iceland

Oman

Solomon Islands

Federated States of Micronesia

Saudi Arabia

Serbia

Argentina

Lebanon

Papua New Guinea

Haiti

Rwanda

Niger
Libya
Timor-Leste
Jamaica
India
Ireland
Samoa
Kiribati
Mali
Nepal
Egypt
Ethiopia
Bhutan
Bahamas
Gambia
Cameroon
Mauritania
Costa Rica
France
Eritrea
Côte d'Ivoire
Viet Nam

United Nations A/72/532/Rev.1

General Assembly

Distr.: General
19 October 2017

Original: English

Seventy-second session
Agenda item 124
United Nations reform: measures and proposals

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We request that you circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 124.

(*Signed*) Nikki R. **Haley**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-18527 (E) 231017

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Annex to the letter dated 11 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Political Declaration for UN Reform High Level Event[1]

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Eighth, we support the Secretary-General in strengthening the Organization's planning and budget functions to provide greater transparency and predictability on required resources.

Ninth, we support the Secretary-General in making concrete changes in the United Nations system to better align its work on humanitarian response, development, and sustaining peace initiatives.

Tenth, we recognize that each country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development, and we further recognize the role of the United Nations in providing a platform for partnership to enable global sustainable development.

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Spain

Slovakia

Canada

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Benin

Uganda

Vanuatu

Morocco

Yemen

Luxembourg

Republic of Korea

Montenegro

Azerbaijan

Hungary

Slovenia

Malta

Sudan

Palau

Maldives

Germany

Greece

Tuvalu

Poland

Belgium

Czechia

Burkina Faso

Albania

Estonia

Georgia

Philippines

Andorra

Finland

Monaco

Lithuania

Israel

Kenya

Liberia

Uzbekistan

United Arab Emirates

Somalia

Burundi

Netherlands

New Zealand

Colombia

Italy

Australia

Thailand

Brunei

Equatorial Guinea

Republic of Moldova

Panama

Senegal

Peru

Nigeria

Sri Lanka

Tunisia

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bangladesh

Romania

Latvia

Qatar

Mexico

Tonga

Marshall Islands

Uruguay

Algeria

Cyprus

Iraq

Austria

Indonesia

Namibia

Kuwait

Honduras

Malaysia

Bahrain

Japan

Myanmar

Switzerland

Seychelles

Liechtenstein

San Marino

Croatia

Bulgaria

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Kazakhstan

Portugal

Paraguay

Turkey

Denmark

Dominican Republic

Norway

Sweden

Iceland

Oman

Solomon Islands

Federated States of Micronesia

Saudi Arabia

Serbia

Argentina

Lebanon

Papua New Guinea

Haiti

Rwanda

Niger

Libya

Timor-Leste

Jamaica

India

Ireland

Samoa

Kiribati

Mali

Nepal

Egypt

Ethiopia

Bhutan

Bahamas

Gambia

Cameroon

Mauritania

Costa Rica

France

Eritrea

Côte d'Ivoire

Viet Nam

Mongolia